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I. Overview of the research 
To what extent do Italian courts adapt the national legal instruments (principles, rules 
and legal techniques) regarding state structure to the requirements of EU law? This 
paper aims to give an answer to this question by providing an overview of the most 
emblematic cases of “re-adaptations” operated by the Italian courts in order to ensure 
the respect of the structural principles of EU law. In doing so, I will distinguish two 
kinds of principles/rules (i.e. normative enunciations) and instruments/techniques (here 
understood as operative emanations of the normative enunciations) originally conceived 
for other goals and in a second moment used by the Italian Courts in order to comply 
with the EU law requirements. 
The first group is composed of those principles/rules and techniques expressly 
conceived for governing the relationship between Regions and State, provided with a 
more substantive (i.e. non-procedural) nature and reshaped over the years by the Italian 
Constitutional Court. 
The second group is composed of principles/rules and techniques characterizing the 
proceedings before the Italian Constitutional Court (which also serves as final arbiter in 
the conflicts between Regions and State) that are provided with a genuine procedural 
nature and that have been used, over the years, by the Italian Constitutional Court in 
order to guarantee first of all the supremacy of the constitution and, episodically, the 
primacy of EU law. These principles and techniques do not concern exclusively the 
relationship between State and Regions but they can, of course, be used in order to 
guarantee the respect of EU law even in cases involving regional legislation. 
Keeping this mind I have structured this contribution as follows: 
First, I will explain the reasons why research like this is “difficult”, while secondly I 
will move to the analysis of the two groups of legal instruments mentioned above. Some 
final remarks will be presented at the end of the paper. Generally speaking, my main 
idea is that EU law has had a certain impact on the relationship between State and 
Regions in Italy, especially looking at the seasons of the principle of competence, that 
has been understood more and more as referring to the idea of “legislative preference” 
rather than as to the existence of a “legislative reserved domain”1. Other evidence of the 
impact of EU law can be found in the progressive adaptation of instruments born in the 
administrative law domain (and conceived in order to solve problems connected to the 
pathology of administrative acts) to the sphere of application of legislative measures. 
This can be explained looking at the fungibility between administrative and legislative 
acts in the logic of national implementation of EU law measures, which is a leit motiv of 
the ECJ’s case law and which can be traced back to the original absence of a hierarchy 
of legal sources in the EC/EU law context2. 
A preliminary caveat should be made before proceeding with the analysis of the 
instruments and techniques reinvented by the Italian Courts for favouring the respect of 
the principles of EU law. One should keep in mind the strongly dogmatic nature of the 
Italian legal system: while the ECJ has been inspired by a strong pragmatism, which 
gave its case law a certain flexibility, the Italian Constitutional Court is the guardian of 
                                               
1 L.Paladin, Le fonti del diritto italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, 93 ff. 
2 G.Gaja, entry: “Fonti comunitarie”, Digesto delle Discipline Pubblicistiche, VI, UTET, Torino, 1991, 
436 ff. 
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a set of principles imbued with the dogmatic flavour of its legal tradition, very refined 
from a theoretical point of view but also resistant to being reshaped. Bearing this in 
mind, one can appreciate the efforts made by both courts in their attempt to carry out a 
sort of convergence, renouncing, at least partly, their original positions (dualism as for 
the Italian Constitutional Court and monism for the ECJ). 
This premise makes clear the focus of the paper. Given the unitary system of courts 
existing in Italy, and given the particular role of arbiter of conflicts between State and 
Regions that has to be attributed to the Italian Constitutional Court, I am going to focus 
on its case law when developing my reasoning in these pages. This also explains the 
attention paid to the structure of the constitutional principaliter proceedings in the 
second part of the work, principaliter proceedings being the arena of the legislative 
conflicts occurring between State and Regions. Obviously, this does not mean that 
“common” courts (i.e. ordinary and administrative courts) have not readapted legal 
concepts under pressure from EU law, an example is given by the administrative courts, 
as pointed out by the domestic literature.3 
Research like this presents itself as very problematic for at least two reasons: the well 
known principle of “territorial blindness” of the EU, and the less studied “procedural 
impermeability” that characterizes the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court.  
Territorial blindness refers to the fact that, traditionally, from a “formalistic” point of 
view, the Regions have been neglected in the EU law context. To express such a 
situation, German constitutional lawyers use the formula “Landesblindheit”4 (legal 
blindness towards the territorial subnational entities or simply territorial blindness). This 
was confirmed in the Treaties (specifically in the former Article 10 ECT), where it can 
be seen that the subjects of the Community legal order are the states, as holders of the 
duty to collaborate with each other, which is instrumental for guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the supranational law. It could well be argued that this “regional 
neglect” constitutes just one “element” of the democratic deficit of the EU.  
Starting from a “broad” concept of the democratic gap5 (i.e. focused not only on the 
question of the EU Parliament’s powers) we can in fact conceive the absence of a strong 
legal status for the Regions as one of the most important “constitutional wounds” of the 
EU, even after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. There are a number of 
reasons for that: the internationalist origin of the European enterprise, the heterogeneity, 
                                               
3 F. Cortese, “ECJ and Administrative Courts in EU Member States: Towards a Common Judicial 
Reasoning?” in F. Fontanelli, G. Martinico and P. Carozza (eds), Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue. 
International and Supranational Experiences, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2010, 257-271; M. 
Gnes, “Giudice amministrativo e diritto comunitario” 1999 Riv. trim diri. pubbl., 331 ff; N. Pignatelli, 
“L'illegittimità comunitaria dell'atto amministrativo”, Giur. cost., 2008, 3635 ff. 
4 H.P. Ipsen, “Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft”, E. von Caemmerer-H.J. Schlochauer- E. Steindorff 
(eds), Probleme des europäischen Rechts: Festschrift für Walter Hallstein, 1966, Bonn, 248.  
5 R. Bellamy, “Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation and Democracy in the EU”, European Law Journal, 
2006, 725-742; B.Crum, “Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European Union: Does the 
European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?”, European Law Journal, 2005, 452-467; A. 
Follesdal- S. Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, 533-562; G. Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The 
Questions of Standards”, European Law Journal, 1998, 5-28; A. Moravcsik, “In Defence of the 
‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2002, 603-24; J.H.H. Weiler, “Bread and Circus: The State of European Union”, Columbia 
Journal of European Law, 1998, 223-24. 
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in terms of composition, of the Committee of Regions, and the lack of specific remedies 
for them in order to challenge possible violations of their prerogative. 
Despite their unclear status under EU law, Regions play a fundamental role in the 
implementation of the multilevel policies as the example of the cohesion policies 
demonstrate. 
Procedural impermeability refers to the general reluctance of the Italian Constitutional 
Court to be involved in interpretative questions that, directly or indirectly, may have to 
do with EU law. As we will see in the second part of this paper, the origin of this 
doctrine can be traced back to the post-Granital6 scenario, when the Italian 
Constitutional Court decided to entrust the common judges with the role of natural 
guardians of the Simmenthal doctrine.7  
 
II. The substantive principles concerning the relationship between State and 
Regions 
1. The principle of competence 
According to the principle of conferral of competences,8 the State and the Regions can 
only act within the limits of the competences conferred on them by the Constitution to 
attain the objectives set out in the fundamental charter. In Italian constitutional law, 
there are three typologies of competences.9 The first are competences exclusive to the 
State, which are listed in Article 117, paragraph 2, of the Constitution. The second are 
shared (or concurring) competences where State and Regions co-legislate, a “portion” of 
the matter being acknowledged to each. It is up to the State to give the fundamental 
principles of the legislative regime by means of legislation known as “framework law” 
(c.d. “legge-quadro”), and it is up to the Region to fill in (“complete”) the framework by 
giving the detailed provisions, which should be consistent with the fundamental 
principles laid down by the State act. As is evident, this model of “shared competence” 
differs from the German pattern of konkurrierende Gesetzgebung.10 In Germany, when 
the State and its Länder share a competence, the Land “shall have power to legislate so 
long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative power by 
enacting a law” (Art. 72 Const, Grundgesetz). According to the Italian model, instead, 
the activities of the two actors are conceived of as “complementary”. Thirdly, still 
                                               
6 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 170/1984. Granital : 1984 CMLRev 756. About this see: M. Cartabia, 
Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea, Giuffrè, Milan 1995.  
7 ECJ Case C-106/77 Simmenthal [1977] ECR I-62. 
8 On the principle of competence in the Italian legal system, see: G. Zanobini, “Gerarchia e parità tra le 
fonti”, in Studi in onore di S. Romano, vol. I, Padua, 1939, 303; V.Crisafulli, “Gerarchia e competenza 
nel sistema costituzionale delle fonti”, in Rivista Trimestrale Diritto Pubblico, 1960, 775 ff; V. Crisafulli, 
Lezioni di diritto costituzionale, II, 1, L’ordinamento 
costituzionale italiano (le fonti normative), Padua, 1993, 234 ff; A. Moscarini, Competenza e 
sussidiarietà nel sistema delle fonti, Cedam, Padua, 2003; L. Paladin, Le fonti del diritto italiano, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2000, 93 ff 
9 A. D’Atena, “Materie legislative e tipologia delle competenze”, Quaderni Costituzionali, 2003, 15-24. 
10 On this distinction, see A. Anzon, “La delimitazione delle competenze dell’Unione Europea”, 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/anticipazioni/competenze_ue/index.html.  
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according to Article 117 of the Constitution,11 the Regions have legislative powers in all 
subject matters that are not expressly covered by State legislation (i.e., not included in 
                                               
11 Art. 117 provides:  
“Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and 
with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations. 
The State has exclusive legislative powers in the following matters: 
(a) foreign policy and international relations of the State; relations between the State and the European 
Union; right of asylum and legal status of non-EU citizens; 
(b) immigration; 
(c) relations between the Republic and religious denominations;  
(d) defence and armed forces; State security; armaments, ammunition and explosives; 
(e) the currency, savings protection and financial markets; competition protection; foreign exchange 
system; state taxation and accounting systems; equalisation of financial resources; 
(f) state bodies and relevant electoral laws; state referenda; elections to the European Parliament; 
(g) legal and administrative organisation of the State and of national public agencies; 
(h) public order and security, with the exception of local administrative police; 
(i) citizenship, civil status and register offices; 
(l) jurisdiction and procedural law; civil and criminal law; administrative judicial system; 
(m) determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed 
throughout the national territory; 
(n) general provisions on education; 
(o) social security; 
(p) electoral legislation, governing bodies and fundamental functions of the municipalities, provinces and 
metropolitan cities; 
(q) customs, protection of national borders and international prophylaxis; 
(r) weights and measures; standard time; statistical and computerised coordination of data of state, 
regional and local administrations; works of the intellect; 
(s) protection of the environment, the ecosystem and cultural heritage. 
Concurring legislation applies to the following subject matters: international and EU relations of the 
Regions; foreign trade; job protection and safety; education, subject to the autonomy of educational 
institutions and with the exception of vocational education and training; professions; scientific and 
technological research and innovation support for productive sectors; health protection; nutrition; 
sports; disaster relief; land-use planning; civil ports and airports; large transport and navigation 
networks; communications; national production, transport and distribution of energy; complementary 
and supplementary social security; harmonisation of public accounts and co-ordination of public finance 
and taxation system; enhancement of cultural and environmental properties, including the promotion and 
organisation of cultural activities; savings banks, rural banks, regional credit institutions; regional land 
and agricultural credit institutions. In the subject matters covered by concurring legislation legislative 
powers are vested in the Regions, except for the determination of the fundamental principles, which are 
laid down in State legislation. 
The Regions have legislative powers in all subject matters that are not expressly covered by State 
legislation. 
The Regions and the autonomous provinces of Trent and Bolzano take part in preparatory decision-
making process of EU legislative acts in the areas that fall within their responsibilities. They are also 
responsible for the implementation of international agreements and EU measures, subject to the rules set 
out in State law which regulate the exercise of subsidiary powers by the State in the case of non-
performance by the Regions and autonomous provinces. 
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the list of express powers laid down in the same Article 117), and these competences 
should be understood as “exclusive” to the Regions. Following the constitutional reform 
of 2001, the Regions have been invested with a great amount of competence. At least, 
so it seems on paper looking at the Constitution. The transformation of the Regions into 
“residual legislators” represents the most important novelty in the constitutional reform 
of 2001, which has (potentially) contributed to a sort of Copernican revolution. 
However when looking at the real situation, both some judgments of the Italian 
Constitutional Court and the presence of “transversal matters” (matters that are not real 
matters12 but rather clauses allowing the State to intervene in different ambits, for 
example, the so-called legislation on the “determination of the basic level of benefits 
relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout the national 
territory”, which can evidently serve as a Trojan horse for the centralization of 
competences) a very different picture seems to emerge.  
Having recalled the different types of competences, looking at the history of the Italian 
Regions in relation to Europe one can immediately realize how European commitments 
have reshaped the original distribution of competences.13 Many instances of this can be 
found in the case law of the Constitutional Court as we will see in the next sections of 
this paper. The engine of this process has been the territorial blindness mentioned 
above. Since the State is the only entity responsible in case of non-compliance with the 
requirements of EU law, in many cases the European Court of Justice (ECJ)14 has been 
shown not to care about the domestic separation of competences when dealing with 
cases of non-compliance. This in turn has pushed the Italian actors to force the original 
                                                                                                                                         
Regulatory powers shall be vested in the State with respect to the subject matters of exclusive legislation, 
subject to any delegations of such powers to the Regions. Regulatory powers shall be vested in the 
Regions in all other subject matters. Municipalities, provinces and metropolitan cities have regulatory 
powers as to the organisation and implementation of the functions attributed to them. Regional laws shall 
remove any hindrances to the full equality of men and women in social, cultural and economic life and 
promote equal access to elected offices for men and women. 
 Agreements between a Region and other Regions that aim at improving the performance of regional 
functions and that may also envisage the establishment of joint bodies shall be ratified by regional law. 
In the areas falling within their responsibilities, Regions may enter into agreements with foreign States 
and local authorities of other States in the cases and according to the forms laid down by State 
legislation”. 
12 F. Benelli, La «smaterializzazione delle materie». Problemi teorici ed applicativi del nuovo Titolo V 
della Costituzione, Giuffrè, Milan, 2007; F. Benelli, “L'Ambiente tra ‘smaterializzazione’ della materia e 
sussidiarietà legislativa”, www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=content... ; R. Bin, 
“Materie e interessi: tecniche di individuazione delle competenze dopo la riforma del Titolo V”, paper 
presented at the workshop organized by the IDAIC – Siena, 25-26 November 2005, 5; P. Carrozza, “Le 
‘materie’: uso delle tecniche di enumerazione materiale delle competenze e modelli di riferimento del 
‘regionalismo di esecuzione’ previsto dal nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione”, in G.F. Ferrari and G. 
Parodi (eds.), La revisione costituzionale del titolo V tra nuovo regionalismo e federalismo. Problemi 
applicativi e linee evolutive, Cedam, Padua, 2003, 69-124. 
13 T. Groppi, “L’incidenza del diritto comunitario sui rapporti Stato-regioni in Italia dopo la riforma del 
Titolo V”, http://www.unisi.it/ricerca/dip/dir_eco/grop.htm; M.P. Chiti, “Regioni e integrazione europea”, 
in Reg. gov. loc., 1994, 547 ff.; A.D’Atena, “Il doppio intreccio federale: le regioni nell’Unione europea”, 
Le Regioni, 1998, 1401 ff. Recently P.Zuddas, L’influenza del diritto dell’Unione europea sul riparto di 
competenze legislative fra Stato e Regioni, Padua, Cedam, 2010.  
14 See cases 169/82, Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 1603 ff. and 168/85, Commission v Italy [1986] 
ECR 2945. On this, see Groppi, “L’incidenza”; G. Guzzetta, Costituzione e regolamenti comunitari, 
Milan, 1994, 171 ff; M. Cartabia and V. Onida, “Le regioni e la Comunità europea”, in M.P. Chiti and G. 
Greco (eds.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo, Giuffrè, Milan, 1997, 605 ff. 
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distribution of competences in order to avoid sanctions stemming from belonging to the 
EU.15 
Just to be clear, the Italian Constitutional Court, as we will see, has been always open to 
the reshaping of the list of competences listed in the different versions of Article 117. 
We could say that the European mandate has only increased such a predisposition, 
giving another reason to the Italian Constitutional Court to centralize competences in 
favour of the State.16 
When looking at the role of the Regions in the implementation phase, one should 
distinguish between administrative and legislative activities. As for the administrative 
side of the implementation, it has been acknowledged that Regions have the power to 
implement (here implementation should be distinguished from transposition, of course) 
regulations (Art. 6 D.P.R. no. 616/1977). There is recognition of a general function of 
address and coordination for the administrative functions performed by the Regions17 
which can be exercised when the requirements of EU law involve the necessity of 
unitary interest over the whole of the national territory (Art. 9, law no. 86/198918).  
As for the legislative implementation, the issue is much more complicated. Originally 
the State responsibility in cases of non-compliance (D.P.R. no. 4/1972) convinced it to 
centralize the competences on State organs, with the consequent alteration of the 
regional competences. Later (Art. 6 D.P.R. no. 616/1977) the Regions were granted the 
                                               
15 “Regions’ activities – or lack of activities – in their areas of competence have sometimes left Italy 
temporarily out of compliance with EU rules. This is a problem for the national government, as it cannot 
then plead the existence of provisions, practices or circumstances in its internal legal system in order to 
justify a failure to comply with EU obligations and time limits (Case C-33/90, Case C-388/01). Indeed, 
infringement procedures against Italy have been initiated several times over the last decade in fields of 
regional or concurrent competence; that is, in policy areas where the fulfilment of European obligations 
requires legislative or administrative acts by the regions. This has been particularly troublesome in 
environmental matters (e.g., cases C-225/96, C-87/02C-466/99, C-248/02, C-139/04), but has also 
affected trade fairs, markets and exhibitions (Case C-439/99). The Eur-infra database 
(http://eurinfra.politichecomunitarie.it/ElencoAreaLibera.aspx), concerning pending cases at the 
European Court of Justice, supports this conclusion. Indeed, in at least six cases out of 40 concerning 
environmental policies, non-compliance was provoked by regional activity. Conflicts between regioni and 
stato on environmental issues often end up before the Corte Costituzionale. In order to prevent non-
compliance with EU obligations, the stato has been vested with the power to execute by substitution in 
lieu of the regione (Articles 117.5 and 120 Const., Law No. 11/2005). In some cases, the stato is even 
given the authority to act in a preventive way (for instance, under the Constitutional Court’s guidelines 
(Judgment No. 272/2005), the stato could legitimately adopt an urgency instrument in order to implement 
EU obligations (such as the milk quota), without involving the Conferenza Stato-Regioni. National acts 
aimed at avoiding non-compliance are temporary measures, and can be substituted for by properly 
adopted regional acts” P. Bilancia-F. Palermo-O. Porchia, “The European Fitness of Italian Regions”, 
Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 2, issue 2, 2010, E-122-174, E-167, http://www.on-
federalism.eu/attachments/063_download.pdf.  
16 Groppi, “L’incidenza”. 
17 On this function see: L. Paladin, “Sulle funzioni statali di indirizzo e di coordinamento nelle materie di 
competenza regionale”, in Giur. Cost., 1971, I, 189 ff.; F. Bassanini, “Indirizzo e coordinamento delle 
attività regionali”, in D. Serrani (ed.), La via italiana alle regioni, Giuffè, Milano, 1972, 43 ff.; L. 
Carlassare, “I problemi dell’indirizzo e coordinamento: le soluzioni giurisprudenziali”, Le Regioni, 1985, 
29 ff; G. Falcon, “Spunti per una nozione della funzione di indirizzo e coordinamento come vincolo di 
scopo”, Le Regioni, 1989, 1184 ff.  
18 Law 86/89 (“Legge La Pergola”) set up a complex mechanism aimed at ensuring the implementation of 
EU law and introduced an annual Community law (“legge comunitaria”). “Legge La Pergola” has been 
replaced by law n. 11/2005 (“Legge Buttiglione”). 
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power to implement EC directives with regional law, but before doing so they had to 
wait for a State law for the reception of such directives, including the fundamental 
principles of the matter plus some derogable provisions. We will see this point in the 
next section when dealing with the issue of cedevolezza and the more recent evolutions 
of the Italian legislation which acknowledge the possibility that the Regions could 
implement EC directives directly, although with more than one caveat. 
How did the Italian Constitutional Court react to this shift of competences that occurred 
in name of EC law commitments? First, the Italian Constitutional Court seemed to 
admit the possibility that EC law requirements could de facto lead to a particular form 
of shift in the original distribution of competences in the name of the State 
responsibility for compliance with EC law requirements.19 In sentenza no. 224/199420 
the Italian Constitutional Court pointed out how the regional competences are subject to 
limits introduced by EC law, saying that sometimes EC law can render the conditions 
and prerequisites of the regional competence inoperative. In sentenza no. 399/8721 the 
Italian Constitutional Court said that Community bodies are not required to respect 
domestic law fully, even that concerning the distribution of competences between State 
and Regions (at the same time the Italian Constitutional Court stressed the necessity to 
respect fundamental principles of the Italian constitutional system- the so-called 
“counter-limits”22). In that case, within the frame of the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes, EC legislation has given the Regions functions that differ in part from 
those included in the catalogue of competences in the national Constitution. 
The leading case in this matter is sentenza no. 126/1996,23 where the Italian 
Constitutional Court pointed out how the implementation of EC norms in the Member 
States has to take into account their structure (centralized, decentralized, federal). 
However, in the name of the principle of State responsibility for the implementation of 
EC law, the Italian Constitutional Court distinguished between a competence of first 
instance accorded to the Regions in the ambits of their competence and a competence of 
second instance accorded to the State. Such a competence of second instance permits 
the intervention of the State but may not create seizure of the competences, rather it 
justifies supplementary substitutive interventions aimed at defending the State itself 
from the risk of non-compliance due to regional omissions or actions.24 This scheme 
                                               
19 See sentenza no. 382/1993 and sentenza no. 632/1988. Groppi, “L’incidenza”; P. Caretti and G.Strozzi, 
“Luci ed ombre nella più recente giurisprudenza costituzionale in materia di adempimento agli obblighi 
comunitari”, in Le regioni, 1988, 196 ff. For a prima facie opposite conclusion, see sentenza no. 
124/1990. 
20 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 224/1994, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
21 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 399/87, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
22 On the counter-limits doctrine, see M. Cartabia, “The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship 
between the Italian Legal System and the European Union”, in A. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. 
Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence, Hart, Oxford, 
1997, 133-146; P. Ruggeri Laderchi, “Report on Italy”, ibid., 147-170. The formula “controlimiti” was 
used for the first time by P. Barile, “Ancora su diritto comunitario e diritto interno”, in Studi per il XX 
anniversario dell’Assemblea costituente, VI, Firenze, 1969, 49 and ff.  
23 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 126/1996, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
24 “L’attuazione negli Stati membri delle norme comunitarie deve tenere conto della struttura 
(accentrata, decentrata, federale) di ciascuno di essi, cosicché l’Italia è abilitata, oltre che tenuta dal suo 
stesso diritto costituzionale, a rispettare il suo fondamentale impianto regionale. Pertanto, ove 
l’attuazione o l’esecuzione di una norma comunitaria metta in questione una competenza legislativa o 
amministrativa spettante a un soggetto titolare di autonomia costituzionale, non si può dubitare 
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explains why it is also recognized that the State might challenge the constitutionality of 
regional laws that contrast with EC law obligations, this being an exception to the 
general rule of procedural impermeability (see infra).  
Sentenza no. 126/1996 represented the outcome of a long jurisprudential journey, 
whereby the Italian Court specified, once again, the possibility of an alteration of the 
normal distribution of competences in the name of unitary reasons connected with the 
compliance with EC/EU requirements (see, ex plurimis, sentenza no. 382/1993 and no. 
389/199525). At the same time it showed how these alterations should be conceived as 
the exception and not as the rule, trying to “normalize” the otherwise devastating impact 
of EC law on the national system. In order to balance the constitutional supremacy (the 
respect of the constitutional distribution of competences) and the primacy of EC law, 
the Italian system has been forced to adopt or to invent cooperative instruments that can 
push State and Regions towards specific agreements in this regard. On the other hand, it 
has forced the Italian Constitutional Court to declare the unconstitutionality of some 
State laws adopted without respecting these cooperative procedures:26  
“The process of European integration has generally affected the traditionally 
uncooperative relationship between stato and regioni in a positive way. However, a 
relatively high number of conflicts remain, especially when compared to other 
European countries. The main conflict-prevention mechanism is the Conferenza stato-
regioni, which brings national and regional governments together to draft general 
policy guidelines or for specific purposes (by means of specialized sub-conferences on 
varying subjects). The most relevant conflict-resolution mechanism in the case of 
tension between the central government and the regioni is still provided by the Corte 
Costituzionale; many cases heard here indeed regard EU affairs. Overall, the court has 
safeguarded regional prerogatives against stato interference, in part by ruling that it is 
unconstitutional for the stato to use its coordination role in EU affairs to take 
competences away from the regioni (Judgment No. 203/2003), at least without the 
regioni’s consent (Judgment No. 68/2008)”27. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
che…normalmente ad esso spetti agire in attuazione o in esecuzione, naturalmente nell’ambito dei 
consueti rapporti con lo Stato e dei limiti costituzionalmente previsti nelle diverse materie di competenza 
regionale..Tuttavia, poiché dell’attuazione del diritto comunitario nell’ordinamento interno, di fronte alla 
Comunità europea, è responsabile integralmente e unitariamente lo Stato…, a questo – ferma restando, 
secondo quanto appena detto, la competenza in ‘prima istanza’ delle regioni e delle province autonome – 
spetta una competenza, dal punto di vista logico, di ‘seconda istanza’, volta a consentire a esso di non 
trovarsi impotente di fronte a violazioni del diritto comunitario determinate da attività positive o omissive 
dei soggetti dotati di autonomia costituzionale. Gli strumenti consistono non in avocazioni di competenze 
a favore dello Stato, ma in interventi repressivi o sostitutivi e suppletivi – questi ultimi anche preventivi, 
ma cedevoli di fronte all’attivazione dei poteri regionali e provinciali normalmente competenti – rispetto 
a violazioni o carenze nell’attuazione o nell’esecuzione delle norme comunitarie da parte delle regioni” 
(sentenza no. 126/1996). On this, see Groppi, “L’incidenza cit”. 
25 Both available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
26 Sentenza no. 203/2003 and sentenza no. 68/2008, both available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
27 P.Bilancia- F.Palermo–O.Porchia, “The European fitness cit”, E-166. 
10 
 
2. The substitutive powers and cedevolezza 
Italy has a long tradition of municipal history. The origins of Italian municipalities can 
be traced back to the Middle Ages (although, of course those “comuni” cannot be 
compared in terms of functions and role to the current municipalities), as a symptom of 
urban revolt against the feudal system.28 More recently, further evidence of the long 
municipal tradition in Italy is that the National Association of Italian Municipalities was 
set up as early as 1901. Of course the history of Italian municipalities encountered 
different phases, for instance, their autonomy was largely affected by the fascist 
centralism, when the National Association of Italian Municipalities was dissolved. In 
1946 it was reconstituted and today municipalities represent the basic administrative 
division in Italy, as provided by Article 118 of the Constitution. 
Why am I insisting on Italian comuni if this piece is supposed to focus on Regions? 
Quite simply, because some of the instruments used in the Italian constitutional system 
in order to coordinate the unitary principle expressed in Article 5 of the Constitution 
with regional autonomy find their origin in the legislation concerning municipal 
autonomy. The best example of this is the substitutive power (or replacement power, 
sometimes also called subsidiary power, potere sostitutivo). Until 2001 there was no 
express mention in the Italian Constitution of EC/EU law obligations and, as is well 
known, the Italian Constitutional Court used Article 11 of the Constitution in order to 
find a constitutional basis for explaining the primacy of European law.29 
In 2001 a new express mention of EU law obligations was codified in Article 117 of the 
Constitution, providing: “Legislative power belongs to the State and the regions in 
accordance with the Constitution and within the limits set by European Union law and 
international obligations”. In the next section we will see that this provision provoked 
interesting innovations in the Italian Constitutional Court’s case law. Soon after the 
reform, the interpretation of this provision created a division among scholars.30 
According to some, Article 117, paragraph 1, would simply codify the pre-existing 
situation: it would grant a sort of a posteriori assent to European primacy31 as it was 
developed by the ECJ and accepted across the European Community. Other scholars, on 
the other hand, emphasized the importance of the constitutional status given to 
European primacy, and asserted that Article 117 paved the way for the acceptance of the 
Italian monist thesis.32 However, looking at the wording of Article 117 one can 
immediately realize how the limitations imposed by EU law obligations apply to both 
                                               
28 See, for instance, M. Ascheri, La città-Stato, Il Mulino, 2008. 
29 M.Cartabia, “The Italian Constitutional Court and cit”. 
30 For an overview, see R. Chieppa, “Nuove prospettive per il controllo di compatibilità comunitaria da 
parte della Corte costituzionale”, in Il Diritto dell'Unione Europea, 3/2007, 493-511, 499 ff; A. Ruggeri, 
“Riforma del titolo V e giudizi di “comunitarietà” delle leggi”, 2007, 
 http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/dottrina/ordinamentieuropei/ruggeri.html. 
31 C. Pinelli, “I limiti generali alla potestà legislativa statale e regionale e i rapporti con l’ordinamento 
comunitario”, in Foro italiano, V, 2001, 194 ff.. 
32 F. Paterniti, “La riforma dell’art. 117, 1° co. della Costituzione e le nuove prospettive dei rapporti tra 
ordinamento giuridico nazionale e Unione Europea”, in Giur. Cost., no. 2/2004, 2101 ff; A. Pajno, “Il 
rispetto dei vincoli derivanti dall’ordinamento comunitario come limite alla potestà legislativa nel nuovo 
Titolo V della Costituzione”, in Le Istituzioni del federalismo, 2003, 814-842. 
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the regional and state legislators, in light of the new distribution of competences carried 
out by the constitutional reform of 2001.33 
This express reference to EU law obligations explains the rationale of the substitutive 
power, which was expressly codified in the Constitution in 2001: 
“…The Government can act for bodies of the regions, metropolitan cities, provinces 
and municipalities if the latter fail to comply with international rules and treaties or 
EU legislation, or in the case of grave danger for public safety and security, or 
whenever such action is necessary to preserve legal or economic unity and in 
particular to guarantee the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social 
entitlements, regardless of the geographic borders of local authorities. The law shall 
lay down the procedures to ensure that subsidiary powers are exercised in compliance 
with the principles of subsidiarity and loyal co-operation”34 
On closer examination, it is possible to find another express reference to the notion of 
substitutive power in Article 117, par. 5 of the Italian Constitution: 
“The Regions and the autonomous provinces of Trent and Bolzano take part in 
preparatory decision-making process of EU legislative acts in the areas that fall within 
their responsibilities. They are also responsible for the implementation of international 
agreements and EU measures, subject to the rules set out in State law which regulate 
the exercise of subsidiary powers by the State in the case of non-performance by the 
Regions and autonomous provinces”. 
There has been a huge debate in Italy about the relationship between these two forms of 
subsidiary powers. They are both forms of substitutive powers, according to scholars, 
but it is not clear how these two provisions should be coordinated. According to some 
authors, Article 120 of the Constitution would provide the genus of substitutive powers 
existing in the constitutional system, while Article 117 would refer to one species of the 
genus; it would be a mere specification of Article 120. According to other scholars35, 
instead, Article 120 would refer to a form of administrative substitution (this would 
explain why the provision refers to the government), while Article 117 – devoted to the 
redistribution of legislative competences – would refer to a form of legislative 
substitution (and this would explain why it mentions the State rather than the 
government). 
As noted above, this is the first constitutionalization of such an instrument, although 
traces of this power can be found in the legislative regime regarding the municipalities 
(namely Art. 193 Testo Unico 1898; Art.169 and 174 Testo Unico 1889; Art. 210 Testo 
                                               
33 For a brief overview of Italian regionalism in English, see: M. Keating- A. Wilson, “Federalism and 
Decentralisation in Italy”, http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/930_598.pdf.  
34 Article 120. 
35 For an overview of the debate, see: C.Mainardis, Poteri sostitutivi statali e autonomia amministrativa 
regionale, Giuffrè, Milan, 2007; C. Mainardis, “I poteri sostitutivi statali: una riforma costituzionale con 
(poche) luci e (molte) ombre”, Le Regioni, 2001, 1369 ff.; E.C. Raffiotta, Gli interventi sostitutivi nei 
confronti degli enti territoriali, PhD thesis, University of Bologna, 2008, available at 
http://amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it/748/, 66 ff. L. Buffoni, La metamorfosi della funzione di controllo nella 
Repubblica delle Autonomie. Saggio critico sull'art. 120, comma II, della Costituzione, Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2007 
12 
 
Unico 1908; Art. 216 Testo Unico 191536) and confirms how such a power can be 
traced back to the instruments of control over the activity of municipalities.37  
Looking at the Republican era, which started with the coming into force of the new 
Italian Constitution (1948), another codification of the substitutive power – with express 
regard to the Italian Regions – can be found in some provisions included in the 
fundamental charters (“Statuti) of the Special Regions38 and by the measures of 
implementation of such special statutes (see Art. 50 of the Statuto of Sardinia and Art. 
33 D.P.R. no. 480/1975 concerning Sardinia and Art. 39 of law no. 196/1978; Art. 2, p. 
3, D.P.R. no. 182/1982). Just to be clear, all these provisions provide forms of 
“administrative” substitutive powers or forms of substitution that can be traced back to 
the relationship between administrations. This is evident especially in view of their 
municipal origin, while the form of substitutive power governed by Articles 117 and 
120 of the Italian Constitution seems to refer to forms of “legislative” substitutive 
interventions as well but recently the Italian Constitutional Court expressed a different 
orientation making the picture more complicate 39. This is confirmed by Article 8 of law 
no. 131/200340 (the legge La Loggia) which implemented Article 120 by specifying the 
conditions and the procedure to be followed in case of exercise of the substitutive 
power.41 
                                               
36 See Raffiotta, Gli interventi sostitutivi, 13 ff.  
37 On the relationship between the activity of control and the substitutive power, see: F.G. Scoca, “Potere 
sostitutivo e attività amministrativa di controllo”, in AA.VV. Aspetti e problemi dell’esercizio del potere 
di sostituzione nei confronti dell’amministrazione locale, Giuffrè, Milan, 1982, 17 ff; A. de Michele, “Il 
potere sostitutivo dello Stato e delle Regioni nel Titolo V, Parte II, della Costituzione, nella legislazione 
attuativa e nella giurisprudenza”, PhD thesis, University of Bologna, 2007, 
http://amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it/122/.  
38 In Italy there are two “kinds” of Regions. Fifteen ordinary Regions and five special Regions are listed 
in Art. 116 of the Constitution: “Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and 
Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste have special forms and conditions of autonomy pursuant to the special 
statutes adopted by constitutional law. The Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol Region is composed of the 
autonomous provinces of Trent and Bolzano. 
Additional special forms and conditions of autonomy, related to the areas specified in art. 117, 
paragraph three and paragraph two, letter l) - limited to the organisational requirements of the Justice of 
the Peace - and letters n) and s), may be attributed to other Regions by State Law, upon the initiative of 
the Region concerned, after consultation with the local authorities, in compliance with the principles set 
forth in art. 119. Said Law is approved by both Houses of Parliament with the absolute majority of their 
members, on the basis of an agreement between the State and the Region concerned”. Currently in Italy 
there a debate about the real “specialty” of these five Regions after the new powers given to the ordinary 
regions by the constitutional reform of 2001 which gave ordinary regions “exclusive legislative power 
with respect to any matters not expressly reserved to state law”. Important differences between ordinary 
and special Regions are given by the nature of their fundamental charter (Statuto)- because ordinary 
Regions have fundamental charters approved by their Regional Councils- and by the issue of the financial 
autonomy, issue connected to the current reform in the field of fiscal federalism. On the Italian reform 
concerning fiscal federalism, in English, see F. Scuto, “The Italian Parliament Paves the Way to Fiscal 
Federalism”, Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 2, issue 1, 2010, E-67-88.  
39 Contra, recently, the Italian Constitutional Court: sentenza 361/2010, www.cortecostituzionale.it   
40 On this, see G. Scaccia, “Il potere di sostituzione in via normativa nella legge n. 131 del 2003. Prime 
note”, available at www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it.  
41 As for the subsidiary intervention mentioned by Art. 117, the implementing measure is represented by 
law no. 11/2005 (legge Buttiglione), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05011l.htm.  
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As for the procedure to be followed, both laws provide similar procedures.42 The 
president of the Council of Ministers or the Minister for Community Policy gives a term 
to comply, and can also ask for the submission of the question to the permanent 
Conference on relations between the State, the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces 
of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen in order to arrange the necessary initiatives to be taken. In 
case of inertia of the interested territorial actors, the president of the Council of 
Ministers or the Minister for the Community Policies may propose to the Council of 
Ministers the initiatives to be taken for the exercise of the substitutive power (Art. 10, 
par. 3, law no. 11/2005; similarly Art. 8 of law no. 131/2003). 
Returning to the substantive dimension of the substitutive power, it should be said that, 
even in the pre-2001 legal scenario – and despite the absence of a constitutional basis – 
there was room for forms of legislative substitution in spite of the wording of Article 11 
of law no. 86/89 which expressly provided the substitutive power of the government in 
case of the administrative inactivity of Regions and Autonomous Provinces 
(Bolzano/Bozen and Trento). This original provision should be read together with the 
original wording of Article 6 of law no. 86/89, which did not provide at that time the 
possibility for the Regions to implement European directives in a direct manner (this 
power was granted only to the special Regions within the matter of their exclusive 
competences). In fact, under Article 6 of D.P.R. no. 616/1977, Regions were allowed to 
implement EC directives only after the entry into force of a State act containing the 
fundamental principles that should be followed by the regional legislator. At the same 
time Article 6 provided for this State act the possibility to give some detailed provisions 
that would have been waived by the forthcoming regional legislation. These norms were 
considered necessary to guarantee the compliance of the Italian State in case of 
legislative inertia by the regional legislator, and their legitimacy was supported by the 
Italian Constitutional Court.43 
Later, the Regions were granted the power to implement European legislation directly 
without waiting for the State act of reception of the directive in the national system (law 
nos. 183/1987 and 86/1989). However, the Regions were asked to wait for the approval 
of the first national (annual) Community Act following the notification of the directive 
before implementing it.  
This mechanism again resulted in frustrating the power of direct implementation of the 
Italian Regions.  
Finally, thanks to the novelties that came into force with law no. 128/98, the ordinary 
Regions have been empowered to implement European directives directly. This partly 
                                               
42 Art. 10, par. 3, law no. 11/2005: “Nei casi di cui al comma 1, qualora gli obblighi di adeguamento ai 
vincoli derivanti dall’ordinamento comunitario riguardino materie di competenza legislativa o 
amministrativa delle regioni e delle province autonome, il Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri o il 
Ministro per le politiche comunitarie informa gli enti interessati assegnando un termine per provvedere 
e, ove necessario, chiede che la questione venga sottoposta all’esame della Conferenza permanente per i 
rapporti tra lo Stato, le regioni e le province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano per concordare le 
iniziative da assumere. In caso di mancato tempestivo adeguamento da parte dei suddetti enti, il 
Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri o il Ministro per le politiche comunitarie propone al Consiglio dei 
ministri le opportune iniziative ai fini dell’esercizio dei poteri sostitutivi di cui agli articoli 117, quinto 
comma, e 120, secondo comma, della Costituzione, secondo quanto previsto dagli articoli 11, comma 8, 
13, comma 2, e 16, comma 3, della presente legge e dalle altre disposizioni legislative in materia.”. 
43 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 182/87, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
14 
 
explains why the letter of Article 11 of law no. 86/89 refers only to cases of 
administrative inactivity.44 This reading, in a way, has been supported by the Italian 
Constitutional Court as well, in its decision no. 425/99.45  
There is another element that makes this kind of substitutive power in case of non-
compliance with the European requirements particular: from the theoretical point of 
view, the idea of substitution seems to imply the adoption of the substitutive instrument 
subsequent to inactivity by the Region. However, on closer examination, before the 
coming into force of law no. 128/98, Article 9 of law no. 86/89 referred to a form of 
“preventive substitution”, since it provided for State intervention initially, with a 
national act composed of two kinds of provisions. A first group of provisions gave the 
fundamental principles that could not be waived by the regional legislation and a second 
group of specific provisions (“disposizioni di dettaglio”) from which Regions could 
deviate by means of their regional laws. According to this scheme, even in the case of 
regional inactivity, the requirements of EC law would have been satisfied thanks to the 
detailed provisions included in the national law. 
On the contrary, if the Regions had approved a regional law, these national detailed 
provisions would have “ceded”, giving up their intrusion in that portion of the shared 
competence belonging to the regional legislator, and the hand of the State legislator 
would “draw back”, leaving room for the new regional regime. This mechanism is 
called in Italy cedevolezza46 (from the Italian “cedere”, “to cede”) and has represented a 
fil conducteur of Italian regionalism since 1970, the year of the effective birth of the 
ordinary regions. This mechanism works in the field of shared competences and it can 
be seen as a technique devised by the Italian State legislator (and supported by the 
Italian Constitutional Court over the years) in order to avoid the danger of legislative 
gaps. In order to challenge any possible horror vacui, the State legislator has been 
granted the power to make “temporary” detailed provisions that represent an intrusion in 
the legislative competences of the Regions. These have been upheld by the Italian 
Constitutional Court47 because of their “temporary” and “supplementary” nature, since 
they are supposed to “disappear” magically once the Regions exercise their portion of 
legislative competence. In case of regional inactivity, as said above, the horror vacui is 
avoided thanks to the presence of a (State) regulation. As we saw, in the Italian context, 
by “shared competences” one refers to the sphere of competence that has to be 
completed or filled in by coordination between two legislative actors that participate, 
according a hypothetical division of labour, in the exercise of the legislative power.  
This “division of labour” refers to the fact that the State act intervening in a matter 
characterized by shared competences was supposed to give, primarily, the “fundamental 
principles” (“principi fondamentali”) that should then be followed by the Regional 
legislator, which should in turn build on these principles by passing detailed legislation. 
                                               
44 On this story, see: G.U. Rescigno, “Attuazione regionale delle direttive comunitarie e potere sostitutivo 
dello Stato”, Le Regioni, 2002, 735 and Groppi, “L’incidenza”.  
45 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 425/99, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
46 On cedevolezza, see: M. Motroni, Le norme cedevoli nel rapporto tra fonti statali e fonti regionali, PhD 
thesis, University of Ferrara, 2010, http://eprints.unife.it/323/1/TESI_DEFINITIVA.pdf.  
47 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 214/1985, www.cortecostituzionale.it. Compare this judgment with 
sentenza no. 40/1972, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. See also decisions in cases no. 192/ 1987 
and no. 729/1988, www.cortecostituzionale.it. For a complete overview in Italian see: Motroni, Le norme 
cedevoli, 63-94. 
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According to this scheme, it is possible to distinguish the idea of shared competences 
applied in Italy from that experienced in other contexts, like Germany, for instance. 
One could connect the emergence of cedevolezza to the necessity of guaranteeing 
legislative continuity in intra-temporal relationships. Since the birth of the Italian 
(ordinary) Regions implied the transfer of competences, this meant that previously the 
matters within the new regional jurisdiction were already subject to State legislation. 
Considering these previous State acts as automatically invalid would have led to the risk 
of legislative gaps pending the passing of new regional acts. As we can see, according 
to this logic, cedevolezza is justified on the basis of the entry into force of a new 
constitutional parameter and the necessity of guaranteeing stability in a period of 
transition.48 The Constitutional Court followed the same logic soon after the 
constitutional reform of 2001 which, as we know, changed the distribution of 
competences between the ordinary Regions and the State. However, what it is evident 
once we know the evolution of the Italian regional system is the use of cedevolezza even 
from the start of the functioning of the Regional legislatures as the rule to be followed 
in all the cases of legislation that involve shared competences, a practice upheld by the 
Italian Constitutional Court in 1985.49 
The adoption of the technique of cedevolezza confirms the rise of a new kind of way of 
conceiving of the principle of “competence” as “legislative” preference rather than as “a 
legislative reserved domain”.50 According to this scheme, the Italian Constitution, when 
granting a portion of shared competence to the regional legislator, expressed a 
preference for this actor but, in order to guarantee the continuity of the legal order, 
admits the possibility of a temporary and derogable State legislative supply. More 
pragmatically, cedevolezza has permitted an evident centralization and a de facto 
alteration of the distribution of competences over the years, since it has been used 
frequently in combination with the recall of “unitary principles”, finally favouring the 
centralization of the competences.51 Even after the coming into force of the new Title V 
of the Italian Constitution, cedevolezza seems to be still alive, despite what the Italian 
Constitutional Court has seemed to suggest in occasional decisions, like one given in 
2002.52 
Returning to the specific field of the implementation of EU law measures, one could 
wonder whether the new Article 117 of the Constitution, which expressly codifies the 
regional competence to comply with EU law requirements, can represent the end of the 
technique of cedevolezza in this specific ambit. Despite the many doubts raised by 
                                               
48 M.Motroni, Le norme cedevoli cit, 63-94. 
49 “La legge dello Stato [non] deve essere necessariamente limitata a disposizioni di principio, essendo 
invece 
consentito l’inserimento anche di norme puntuali di dettaglio, le quali sono efficaci soltanto per il tempo 
in cui la Regione non abbia provveduto ad adeguare la normativa di sua competenza ai nuovi principi 
dettati dal 
Parlamento”, Corte Costituzionale, no. 214/85. 
50 L. Carlassare, “La ‘preferenza’ come regola dei rapporti tra fonti statali e regionali nella potestà 
legislativa ripartita”, Le Regioni, 1986, 236 ff. 
51 Among others, A. D’Atena, Le Regioni dopo il big-bang. Il viaggio continua, Milano, 2005, 76 ff. 
52 Case 282/2002, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
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scholars,53 this particular kind of cedevolezza has to be understood as confirmed in this 
ambit by the different Community acts – “leggi comunitarie” – which have come into 
force since the constitutional reform.54 According to this trend, the State legislator is 
allowed to adopt detailed provisions whose coming into force is delayed pending the 
deadline provided for the implementation of the directive in case of regional inertia.55  
Something similar is confirmed in law no. 11/2005, which also provides the State with 
the possibility to perform the substitutive power by a regulation (“regolamento”, which 
is a secondary source) even in matters covered by regional legislation (see Art. 11, par. 
8, of this law).56 This applies even in matters of exclusive regional competence, and 
despite the fact that Article 117 of the Constitution provides: “Regulatory powers shall 
be vested in the State [only?] with respect to the subject matters of exclusive 
legislation”. In conclusion, despite the change of the letter of the Constitution, the case 
law of the Italian Constitutional Court and also the Parliament have confirmed many of 
the principles and practices characteristic of the previous climate of Italian regionalism.  
Before moving to the next section it is interesting to point out how the Italian 
Constitutional Court recently acknowledged the bilateral nature of cedevolezza by 
recognizing the validity of the legislation of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region. These 
norms included some derogable and supplementary fundamental principles introduced 
to prevent the possibility that the absence of a relevant State act would result in a 
situation of regional non-implementation. By regional law no. 11/2005, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia implemented directive 2001/42/CE without waiting for the national legislation 
including the fundamental principles of the matter. Since the matter touched many 
transversal ambits the regional legislator decided to pass regional legislation of 
principle, which had to be understood as derogable once the State legislation of 
principle was ready.57 The Italian Constitutional Court rescued this provision in its 
sentenza no. 398/96.58  
To conclude this section devoted to the mechanism used by the Italian State in order to 
deal with the risk of non-compliance due to regional inertia, one should recall that since 
the State now can ask the Regions for the reimbursement of any costs connected with 
their non-compliance with the requirements of EU law.59  
                                               
53 Motroni, Le norme cedevoli, 95 ff. 
54 Laws no. 39/2002, no. 39, 14/2003 and 306/2003, for instance. 
55 On this, see G.U.Rescigno, “Attuazione regionale delle direttive”. 
56 According to some authors, it is possible to find a basis for this practice in the case law of the 
Constitutional Court, see the judgment in no. 425/99, www.cortecostituzionale.it. See: M.Motroni, Le 
norme cedevoli, 132.  
57 Art. 12 of regional law no. 11/2005: “1. Le disposizioni contenute nel presente capo e nei regolamenti 
attuativi sono adeguate agli eventuali principi generali successivamente individuati dallo Stato nelle 
proprie materie di competenza esclusiva e concorrente di cui all’articolo 117, commi 2 e 3, della 
Costituzione, con riferimento alla direttiva 2001/42/CE. 2. Gli atti normativi statali di cui al comma 1 si 
applicano, in luogo delle disposizioni regionali in contrasto, sino alla data di entrata in vigore della 
normativa regionale di adeguamento”. 
58 Corte Costituzionale sentenza no. 398/2006, www.cortecostituzionale.it. S. Tripodi, “L’attuazione 
regionale delle direttive comunitarie e le clausole di cedevolezza. Nota a Corte cost., sent. n. 398/2006”, 
in www.federalismi.it, and M.Motroni, Le norme cedevoli cit, 134-137. 
59Art. 16- bis law no. 11/2005. On this see: P.Bilancia-F.Palermo-O.Porchia, “The European fitness cit”, 
E-167.  
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3. The principle of subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity could be conceived of as an example of a principle that was originally alien 
to the Italian Constitution which was introduced under the pressure applied by the EU 
level.  
As defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, subsidiarity implies the concept “that a 
central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which 
cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level”.60 This implies both 
a constitutional preference for the exercise of a competence by the periphery and a 
“constitutional restraint on the exercise of those competences”61 for the centre. 
The subsidiarity principle, due to its physiology, requires a system of competences at 
least tending towards a repartition, and at the same time presupposes an “integrated” 
system like, for example, a federal system of a cooperative type. As a matter of fact, the 
principle, as provided in the old Article 5 of the ECT, refers to a relationship between 
two institutional actors (a lower actor, the periphery, and a higher actor, the centre) 
sharing the same power and whose exercise is preferentially given, at first instance, to 
the actor closer to the citizens (i.e., the local level). Scholars usually label this first 
instance as the negative side of subsidiarity, since it implies the duty of non-intervention 
by the centre. At the same time, this principle allows the possibility to substitute the 
chosen local actor if the same power can be exercised in a better or more efficient way 
by the higher level. This way subsidiarity works as an elevator with regard to certain 
fungible acts that can be exercised in abstract by two institutional subjects and the 
substitution can be caused by the objective impossibility of the preferred actor carrying 
out the requested action.  
Another important fact is that such impossibility of carrying out the functions has to be 
temporary this way there will be no obstacles to the restitution of the power. In this 
respect, it has been pointed out that the subsidiarity principle actually works as a 
criterion for shifting, although not in a definitive way, the level that is supposed to 
intervene62 and, because of its constitutional relevance, it works as an element of 
flexibility in the system.63 This would explain why, within the EC context, subsidiarity 
has operated as a “method of policy centralisation”64 rather than as a factor of 
valorization of the de-centred realities in the absence of a formal catalogue of 
competences. subsidiarity and competence are not, nevertheless, in a relationship of 
identity: in fact, it has been said that the principle of subsidiarity is not intended so 
much for the a priori formal allocation of competences, but rather for the a posteriori 
legitimation of the exercise of competences beyond those formally attributed.65 
                                               
60 Oxford English Dictionary, entry “Subsidiary” and “Subsidiarity”.  
61 R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The Changing Structure of European Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009, 246. 
62 I. Massa Pinto, Il principio di sussidiarietà. Profili storici e costituzionali, Jovene, Naples, 2003, 82.  
63 R. Bin, “I decreti di attuazione della «legge Bassanini» e la ‘sussidiarietà verticale’”, in A. Rinella, L. 
Coen and R. Scarciglia (eds), Sussidiarietà e ordinamenti costituzionali, Cedam, Padua, 1999, 169 ff.  
64 G. Davies, “Subsidiarity as a Method of Policy Centralisation”, Hebrew University International Law 
Research Paper No. 11-06, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921454.  
65 Massa Pinto, Il principio di sussidiarietà, 81. 
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Having recalled the theoretical notion of subsidiarity and mentioned its uncertain nature 
in EU law, it is useful to see how the Italian Constitution has codified it. The principle 
of subsidiarity is dealt with by Article 118 of the Constitution both in its vertical and 
horizontal meaning: 
“Administrative functions are attributed to the Municipalities, unless they are attributed 
to the provinces, metropolitan cities and regions or to the State, pursuant to the 
principles of subsidiarity, differentiation and proportionality, to ensure their uniform 
implementation. 
Municipalities, provinces and metropolitan cities carry out administrative functions of 
their own as well as the functions assigned to them by State or by regional legislation, 
according to their respective competences. State legislation shall provide for co-
ordinated action between the State and the Regions in the subject matters as per Article 
117, paragraph two, letters b) and h), and also provide for agreements and co-
ordinated action in the field of cultural heritage preservation. 
The State, regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and municipalities shall promote the 
autonomous initiatives of citizens, both as individuals and as members of associations, 
relating to activities of general interest, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity” 
The principle of subsidiarity is also recalled at Article 120 of the Constitution, as we 
saw, and it is understood there as a limit to the indiscriminate use of the substitutive 
power of the government.  
In sentenza no. 303/2003 the Italian Constitutional Court reshaped the distribution of 
competences codified in the Constitution by using the subsidiarity principle as a Trojan 
horse. The Court stated that the national legislator is allowed to take away the exercise 
of administrative functions in matters belonging to the regional concurring legislative 
power when a uniform exercise of these administrative functions is required. It is 
evident that the Italian Constitutional Court has expanded the original ambit of 
application of the subsidiarity principle by inventing a mechanism which was associated 
to the idea of “national interest”66 present in the wording of the old Title V of the 
Constitution but which disappeared after the 2001 reform. According to many authors, 
however, it is still present as an unwritten limit to the Regions’ powers:67 
“While the principle of subsidiarity is used to allocate administrative functions, it is 
also used to introduce an element of flexibility into the constitutional distribution of 
legislative power. Under the  
principle of legality (a pillar of the rule of law), functions that are exercised at the 
national level according to the principle of subsidiarity must be organized and 
                                               
66 On the national interest (“interesse nazionale”) see: A. Barbera, Regioni e interesse nazionale, Giuffrè, 
Milan, 1973. 
67 For an account of this debate, see R. Bin, “L'interesse nazionale dopo la riforma: continuità dei 
problemi, discontinuità della giurisprudenza costituzionale”, 
http://www.robertobin.it/ARTICOLI/interessi%20nazionali.htm; A. Barbera, “Chi è il custode 
dell'interesse nazionale?”, Quad. cost. 2001, 345 ff.  
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regulated by national law. In this way, one may derogate from the allocation of 
legislative competences contained in article 117 of the Constitution”68.  
It seems useful to recall the solutions suggested by the Italian Constitutional Court for 
the relationship between subsidiarity and loyal cooperation: the former requires a “loyal 
cooperation” (“leale collaborazione”) between the territorial actors, concerted practices 
and bodies and, finally, a system of agreements between the institutional actors. When 
deciding case no. 303/200369, the Italian Constitutional Court adopted “a procedural 
and consensual approach to the principles of subsidiarity and adequacy, and it denied 
that such principles can operate as mere verbal formulas capable of modifying, to the 
advantage of national law, the allocation of legislative powers established by the 
Constitution”.70 
In doing so, the Italian Constitutional Court fixed a set of conditions under which a 
derogation to the allocation of competences designed by the Constitution could be 
possible: the derogation should be “proportionate to the public interest that justifies the 
exercise of regional functions by the state, it must not be unreasonable in light of strict 
constitutional scrutiny, and, finally, the derogation should be the result of an agreement 
with the region”71. 
This episode tells us at least two things. First, it confirms the centrality of the 
Constitutional Court in the destiny of Italian regionalism. Secondly, it makes the task of 
tracing the constitutionalized idea of subsidiarity back to the EC (or German) model 
more complicated. While the ECJ normally avoids engaging in debates concerning 
subsidiarity, the Italian Constitutional Court used subsidiarity to reshape Italian 
regionalism. Of course, looking at the results achieved by the two courts with their 
respective behaviours, they are analogous: in both cases, despite its original meaning 
and goal (favouring the decentralized exercise of “constitutional” functions), 
subsidiarity worked as a factor of centralization. However, the paths followed in these 
two cases seem to be different. 
 
II. The adaptation of some procedural principles/norms and techniques 
characterizing the proceedings before the Italian Constitutional Court: procedural 
impermeability and disapplication. 
As we know, at the beginning of this “love affair”, the two Courts started from opposing 
positions of monism (ECJ) and dualism (Italian Constitutional Court). During the 
following years, this purity was replaced and the Constitutional Court began to talk 
about two “autonomous and separated, although coordinated” systems (see case no. 
170/1984); at the same time the ECJ demonstrated its appreciation of the efforts of these 
national actors by assuming, at times, a benign and tolerant attitude. Some scholars have 
defined such a situation of partial convergence by using the formula “(limited) 
                                               
68 T. Groppi and N. Scattone, “Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 2006, 4 (1): 131-137, 134. 
69 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 303/2003, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
70 T. Groppi-N. Scattone, “Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle”, 135. See also A. Morrone, “La Corte 
costituzionale riscrive il Titolo V?”, available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it.  
71 Ibid. 
20 
 
flexibilization of supremacies”.72 Despite this convergence, the tension between these 
two actors has not disappeared due to the progressive expansion of the ECJ’s activity in 
national fields. The first characteristic of the jurisdictional dialogue described is the 
“mutability” of the starting position of the Constitutional justices: it is possible in fact to 
observe a strong evolution in the Italian Constitutional Court case law. In case no. 
14/1964,73 for example, the Italian Court interpreted the relationship between national 
and EC acts in the light of chronological criteria (on the basis of the fact that the 
enabling act of ratification of the Treaties was an ordinary legislative act); later, in case 
no. 183/197374 the Court changed its position, saying that the constitutional basis of EC 
law primacy can be found in Article 11 of the Italian Constitution. This provision was 
conceived with Italy’s participation in the UN or other limited-power organizations in 
mind, but not for the EU. The latter in fact imposes limitations of sovereignty for goals 
that go beyond “peace and justice between nations”; the Italian Constitutional Court 
was forced to “manipulate” the original meaning of Article 11 in order to allow such 
limitations.75 The Italian Court had entrusted the respect for primacy to itself (as a 
control of indirect violation of Article 11 for those national provisions challenging EC 
law) but the consistency of EC law with the Italian Constitution could not be controlled 
by the Italian Constitutional Court because the latter could only rule on the validity of 
Italian laws. In fact in 198476 the Italian Court again changed its view on this matter 
under pressure from the Simmenthal judgment given by the ECJ and decided to entrust 
such control to the national ordinary judges.  
Even after the Granital judgment the contrasts between the Courts did not subside. First 
of all, the ECJ has progressively obtained the trust of the ordinary judges, whose role is 
fundamental in the activity of the Constitutional Courts. A clear result of such an 
influence is the degeneration of the relationship between ordinary judges and 
Constitutional Courts: when the ordinary judges seek clarification in the reading of the 
relationship between the EC law and the national constitutions, they do not refer to their 
Constitutional Court but rather to the ECJ. This is the outcome of the self-exile of the 
Constitutional Court, which rarely declares admissible questions concerning the 
relationship between legal orders. For example, in 2002, the Italian Constitutional Court 
ruled in just ten cases (out of 500 in total) relating to the EC legal order.77  
This can be described as “impermeability” between the activity of the Italian 
Constitutional Court and the application of EU law. The general rule followed by the 
Italian (and also the Spanish) Constitutional Court is that of the “impermeability” 
between questions of constitutionality and questions regarding the relationship between 
EC/EU law and national law which are defined (expressly in Spain) as mere questions 
                                               
72 V. Ferreres Comella, 2005, “La Constitución española ante la clausula de primacia del Derecho de la 
Unión europea. Un comentario a la Declaración 1/2004 del Tribunal Constitucional 1/2004”, in A. Lopez 
Castillo-A. Saiz Arnaiz - V. Ferreres Comella, Constitución española y constitución europea, CEPC, 
Madrid, 2005, 77-100, 80-89. 
73 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 14/1964, in www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
74 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 183/1973, in www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
75 After 2001 (revision of the Fifth Title of the Italian Constitution) an explicit reference to the EC legal 
order is contained in Art. 117.  
76 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 170/1984. Granital : 1984 CMLRev 756.  
77 M. Cartabia- A.Celotto, La giustizia costituzionale in Italia dopo la Carta di Nizza, Giur. Cost, 2002, 
4477 ff.  
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of “legality”. Generally speaking, we can say that the Constitutional Court accepted the 
primacy of EC law over national law but entrusted its guarantee (the “Simmenthal 
mandate”) to the national common judges. The normal solution for the conflict between 
EC law (if provided with direct effect) and national law is that of non-application (“non 
applicazione”).  
In the Italian context, the Constitutional Court accepted the fact that the guarantee of the 
EC law’s primacy was entrusted to national judges with an important specification: 
technically, the judge cannot “disapply” the national law contrasting with an EC act but 
he must “not apply” the national rule contrasting with directly applicable EC law (a 
regulation, in the earlier case law, but then also self-executing directives and 
interpretive rulings concerning directly effective and directly applicable norms, see 
cases no. 113/1985 and 389/198978). Disapplication, in the Constitutional Court’s 
reasoning, is a figure of invalidity which would presume a hierarchical relationship 
between supranational and national legal orders.79 However, it is clear that in spite of 
these theoretical distinctions, the origin of “non-application” can be traced back to the 
technique of “disapplication”, a technique born and raised in the field of administrative 
law, connected to the distinction between ordinary (i.e. “non-administrative”) and 
administrative justice80 and which is based on Articles 4 and 5 of Law no. 2248/1865, 
Annex E, which empowers the ordinary (i.e. non administrative) judge to set aside 
(disapply) an administrative act without annulling it (since the ordinary judge is not 
allowed to declare the invalidity of an administrative act because of the division of 
labour existing between ordinary and administrative judges in Italy). Such a decision 
limits its effects to the economy of the case pending before the judge, it thus has a mere 
inter partes effect. Thanks to the disapplication the ordinary judge was given the 
opportunity to “bypass” the invalidity of an administrative act without infringing the 
rules governing its mandate. A confirmation of the common nature of these two 
phenomena can be found in the recent change of the terminology employed by the 
                                               
78 Both available at www.cortecostituzionale.it  
79 It would imply, in the Corte Costituzionale’s view, the subordination of the Constitutional Court to the 
ECJ (the hierarchy between orders which conducts to the hierarchy of Courts) while non-application is a 
figure of inefficacy, limited to the specific case before the national judge. But this distinction seems to be 
abandoned by the Italian Corte Costituzionale in its judgment in cases 102/2008 and 103/2008, where the 
Corte used the word “disapplicazione”. 
80 This distinction is also confirmed in Articles 102 and 103 of the Italian Constitution. 
Art. 102: “Judicial proceedings are exercised by ordinary magistrates empowered and regulated by the 
provisions concerning the Judiciary. Extraordinary or special judges may not be established. Only 
specialised sections for specific matters within the ordinary judicial bodies may be established, and these 
sections may include the participation of qualified citizens who are not members of the Judiciary. 
The law regulates the cases and forms of the direct participation of the people in the administration of 
justice.” 
Art. 103: “The Council of State and the other bodies of judicial administration have jurisdiction over the 
protection of legitimate rights before the public administration and, in particular matters laid out by law, 
also of subjective rights. The Court of Accounts has jurisdiction in matters of public accounts and in 
other matters laid out by law. 
Military tribunals in times of war have the jurisdiction established by law. In times of peace they have 
jurisdiction only for military crimes committed by members of the armed forces.” 
22 
 
Italian Constitutional Court in the decisions in cases 102/2008 and 103/200881 where 
the Court used the word “disapplication” instead of “non-application”. 
 
III. The progressive abandonment of the impermeability doctrine: the extension of 
the “interposition technique” 
If impermeability between national law and EC law is the general rule, it is possible to 
find some exceptions in principaliter proceedings, the arena of the legislative conflicts 
involving State and Regions. According to the Italian Constitution, the constitutional 
review of legislation can be triggered and pursued in two different ways: indirect (or 
incidenter) proceedings and direct (or principaliter) proceedings. 
In incidenter proceedings an a quo judge (either ordinary or administrative) can raise 
the question of constitutionality (i.e. of consistency between the Italian law and the 
Constitution) before the Constitutional Court during a trial. The Constitutional Court 
can regard the question as admissible only if it is “relevant” (i.e. significant for the 
solution of the case) and not manifestly groundless. On the contrary, direct proceedings 
are regulated under by Article 127 of the Italian Constitution:  
“(1) Whenever the government regards a regional law as exceeding the powers of the 
region, it may raise the question of its constitutionality before the Constitutional Court 
within sixty days of the publication of the law. 
(2) Whenever a region regards a state law, another act of the state having the force of 
law, or a law of another region, as infringing on its own sphere of powers, it may raise 
the question of its constitutionality before the Constitutional Court within sixty days of 
the publication of the said law or act”. 
According to the scheme provided therein, in case of a constitutional controversy 
arising between the Regions and the State, the government can appeal directly against a 
regional law, and a Region can appeal directly against a national law, or a law enacted 
by another Region. In such cases, constitutional proceedings are conceived to resolve 
disputes between the State and the Regions concerning the limits of their respective 
powers. A huge difference exists between the Regions and State: whilst the former can 
raise the constitutional question only when their sphere of competence is infringed by a 
State act, the State can raise the constitutional question on a regional norm grounded on 
any kind of constitutional “defect”. 
Principaliter proceedings thus represent one of the exceptions to the diffuse review of 
consistency between internal and EC law (i.e. the power that ordinary or administrative 
judges have to monitor the consistency between domestic and EC law); the Italian 
Constitutional Court had already agreed to rule on the issue of contrasts between 
national and EC law within this type of proceeding. According to the decisions in cases 
no. 384/1994 and no. 94/1995,82 indeed, a centralized decision could be envisaged when 
a question of consistency between national and EC law was raised before the 
                                               
81 On these decisions see F. Fontanelli- G. Martinico, “Between Procedural Impermeability and 
Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European 
Court of Justice”, European Law Journal, 2010, 345-364.  
82 Both available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
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Constitutional Court via direct proceedings (both by the Regions and by the State). 
Particularly, in case no. 384/1994 the Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged that, 
due to the particular dynamics of direct proceedings (where the role of the ordinary 
judge – who normally guarantees the respect of EC law – is irrelevant, its refusal to rule 
on such questions would have implied a dangerous gap in the protection of rights, and a 
breach of the legal certainty principle). Therefore, it can be said that, due to the unique 
features of direct proceedings, the residual possibility to involve the Constitutional 
Court is justified only because the ordinary judge, who is the natural guardian of the 
primacy of EC law at the domestic level, is totally missing from the scene.  
In direct (principaliter) proceedings, EC norms are interposed norms [norme interposte] 
that can integrate the parameter for the control of consistency of the regional legislation 
with Article 117, par. 1, of the Constitution” (see sentenze no. 129/2006; no. 406/2005; 
no. 166 and no. 7/2004) or, better, they make the parameter of Art. 117, par. 1, actually 
efficient,83 [and this can give rise to a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of the 
regional norms judged incompatible with EC law.84 Moreover, since no form of appeal 
against its decisions is foreseen (Article 137 of the Constitution), the Constitutional 
Court could not avoid raising the preliminary ruling without infringing on the general 
interest of the uniform application of EC law. After the 2001 reform, two occasions 
arose for testing the new Article 11: judgment no. 406/2005, where the Constitutional 
Court accepted a State claim against a regional law where Article 117, par 1, was the 
only parameter of constitutionality invoked, and in case no. 129/2006.85 In both cases, 
the Italian Consulta decided to appoint Article 117, paragraph 1, of the Italian 
Constitution as the only parameter upon which to decide the question, and refrained 
from using the other constitutional standard of review invoked by the plaintiff. In fact, 
the Consulta declared the regional laws challenged in this case unconstitutional for the 
first time, after many “failed attempts”86 (see cases no. 65, 150, 161, 304, 355, 393, 428, 
434, 469 of 200587).  
Another exception is given by the possible conflict between national law and non-
directly effective EU law: in this case the Constitutional Court is the only guardian of 
the primacy of the supranational system (see the sentenza 28/201088). As we saw, in 
order to “open” the door to the possibility to centralize the solution of the conflict 
between national and supranational law, the Italian Constitutional Court expanded the 
notion of “interposed norm” or “interposed standard”. The idea of the interposed norm 
was conceived by Carlo Lavagna89, an Italian scholar, in the fifties. Normally, the 
criteria for constitutional review may be found in the provisions of the Constitution, in 
the constitutional legislation or in those sources considered equivalent, such as the 
generally recognized principles of international law. In some cases the Court can decide 
                                               
83 This passage is borrowed from sentenza No. 348/2007. 
84 ICC ordinanza No. 103/2008. 
85 ICC, judgement No. 129/2006, www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
86 In these terms, see R.Calvano, ‘La Corte costituzionale ‘fa i conti’ per la prima volta con il nuovo art. 
117 comma 1 Cost.’, (2005) Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 2005, 4417 ff.  
87 See www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
88 See www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
89 C. Lavagna, Problemi di giustizia costituzionale sotto il profilo della non manifesta infondatezza, 
Milan, 1957, 28 ff. 
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to broaden its spectrum by assuming as criteria for constitutional review norms that are, 
from a formal point of view, provided with an inferior status. This happens, for 
instance, when a constitutional provision refers to these norms. This way “a violation of 
an ‘interposed norm’ is tantamount to a violation of the authorizing norm itself”.90 The 
most famous example is given by the legislation enabling/authorizing delegated 
legislation pursuant to Article 76 of the Italian Constitution91. 
Over the years, and especially after the constitutional reform of 2001, the Italian 
Constitutional Court extended this concept in order to deal with a possible violation of 
EU law representing an indirect violation of Article 117 of the Italian Constitution.92 
This revirement can be connected to the increasing openness shown by the Italian 
Constitutional Court towards other forms of extra-national law like the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). In Order No. 103/2008, the Constitutional Court 
recalled the twin cases no. 348 and 349/2007, wherein some national provisions93 were 
declared unconstitutional for being in conflict with the international obligations stated in 
the ECHR, Protocol 1, Article 1. These decisions are very innovative “because not only 
has the Italian Constitutional Court clarified, by using Art. 117, paragraph 1, the 
European Convention’s actual efficacy in the domestic legal system, but it has also 
interpreted international obligations as an interposed standard of review, on the basis 
of which the constitutionality of domestic law must be assessed”.94  
However, it is interesting to note that, in the above mentioned decisions, the Italian 
Constitutional Court delivered lengthy reasons in order to underline the difference 
between EU law (at that time EC law) and the law of the ECHR, based on the difference 
of their effects on domestic law, whereas in Order no. 103/2008 the Court refers to this 
precedent only with a view to supporting its findings on EC law. In other words, the 
Italian Constitutional Court is more interested in using the similarities between EC and 
conventional (international) law than in drawing attention to those passages of 
judgments no. 348 and 349/2007 where the Court itself had provided a careful 
distinction between them. 
 
IV. Final remarks  
Some authors95 have described EU integration as one of the most important factors that 
led to the Italian constitutional reform of 2001. This is true, and by itself it gives an 
exhaustive answer to the research question formulated at the beginning of this paper: all 
the institutional actors, including the judges, have adapted old mechanisms or existing 
                                               
90 A. Pizzorusso- V. Vigoriti-G.L. Certomà, “The Constitutional Review of Legislation in Italy” Temple 
Law Quarterly, 1983,593 ff, 511.  
91 Article 76: “The exercise of the legislative function may not be delegated to the Government unless 
principles and criteria have been established and then only for a limited time and for specified purposes”. 
92 A similar treatment is now granted to the ECHR, see F. Biondi Dal Monte- F. Fontanelli, “The 
Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The Efficacy of the European 
Convention in the Italian Legal System”, German Law Journal, 2008, 889. 
93 Namely, the provisions ruling the quantification of compensation amounts due for public purposes 
expropriation and for unlawful expropriation. 
94 See Biondi F.Dal Monte-F:Fontanelli, “The Decisions cit”, 889 ff.  
95 P.Bilancia-F.Palermo-O.Porchia, “The European fitness cit”, E-144. 
25 
 
principles or, alternatively, amended the Constitution in order to guarantee the 
effectiveness of EU law. As we saw, the Italian Constitutional Court has played a 
fundamental role both in the history of Italian regionalism and, more particularly, in the 
European path of Regions, sometimes supporting the centralization of competences 
other times preserving the regional sphere of autonomy. 
The current phase seems to be characterized by a rediscovery of the importance of 
cooperative instruments and by the procedural principles of subsidiarity and loyal 
cooperation that, in theory at least, should represent a sort of shield against the 
(temporary) alteration of the list of competences. The importance of the Italian 
Constitutional Court in this process explains the attention paid in the second part of this 
paper to the technicalities of the constitutional proceedings. However, as we can see by 
looking at the principles of competence and subsidiarity, the Italian Constitutional Court 
has demonstrated its openness to broad interpretation of the fundamental charter thus 
making our Constitution more flexible. This factor should be taken into account. My 
final impression is that of a (still) quite unstable picture where external (i.e., 
international or European) factors can have a decisive importance in changing, from 
time to time, the outcome of the never-ending balancing act between the competing 
interests of the State and the Regions. 
